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SUMMARY
The purpose of this article is to examine the different ways that Latin Americans and U.S. citizens have chosen to 
remember the history of the Cold War.  Latin Americans have established “truth commissions” to establish the 
facts of what happened to their societies.  They have also brought to justice military dictators and their followers 
who murdered and tortured Latin Americans.  U.S. officials and citizens have declined to reflect on the U.S. role 
in Latin America during the Cold War.  Scholars alone debate the meaning of the Cold War in Latin America.
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RESUMEN
El objetivo de este artículo es analizar las diferentes formas en que los latinoamericanos y los estadounidenses han 
optado por recordar la historia de la Guerra Fría.  Latinoamericanos han establecido “comisiones de la verdad” 
para establecer los hechos de lo sucedido a sus sociedades.  También han llevado ante la justicia a los dictadores 
militares y sus seguidores,  quienes asesinaron y torturaron a ciudadanos latinoamericanos.  Funcionarios y 
ciudadanos norteamericanos se han negado a reflexionar sobre el papel de Estados Unidos en América Latina 
durante la Guerra Fría.  Sólo los académicos debaten acerca del significado de este episodio en la historia de las 
relaciones hemisféricas.
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1. COLD WAR COSTS
The Cold War proved a gruesome time for Latin Americans.  In the four decades that followed 
the overthrow of the constitutional government of President Jacobo Arbenz in 1954 over 200,000 
Guatemalans perished in political violence.  In tiny El Salvador, a country of only 5 million 
people, over 75,000 citizens died, principally during the 1980s.   Over 500,000 citizens fled the 
country and another 500,000 were internally displaced by the political violence.  Warfare ravaged 
Nicaragua during the 1970s and 1980s.  On a per capita basis, Nicaragua lost more citizens 
during its Cold War than did the United States in the Civil War and all of its international wars 
combined.  General Efraín Ríos Montt directed, between 1982 and 1983, the slaughter of over 
40,000 Guatemalans, 80 percent of whom were Mayan people.  Cruelty, death, and destruction 
were not limited to Central America.  During la guerra sucia of the late 1970s, the Argentine 
military and associated death squads massacred 30,000 Argentines.  Many of the dead assumed 
the title ofdesaparecido.  The victims, sometimes alive, were often dumped into the frigid South 
Atlantic from airplanes. The forces of repression did not, however, achieve their goals.  Argentine 
military officers boasted of plans to kill 50,000 people.  General Augusto Pinochet (1973-90) and 
his minions did not ring up extraordinary death tolls (3,500 to 4,500) in Chile.  Pinochet’s acolytes 
specialized in incarceration and torture.  Thirty-six-thousand Chileans submitted affidavits, 
alleging that they had been tortured, to a fact-finding commission.  Scholars estimate that 100,000 
Chileans were tortured while in the hands of Pinochet’s security forces.  Another 200,000 Chileans 
fled the terror and went into exile.  These are astonishing figures for a country of 10 million. 
Michelle Bachelet, the popular and successful president of Chile between 2006 and 2010, endured 
the horror.  Her father, a Chilean general, died of a heart attack after being tortured.  As a young 
woman, Bachelet was abused by the Chilean military (Rabe 2011: 36-174).   
Putting a human face on this agony, telling the disturbing stories of the non-elite victims and 
their loved ones would take a long time.  But evocative examples abound.  Argentine parents had 
delivered to them by security forces the body of their daughter with a rat sewn inside her vagina. 
Rogelia Cruz Martínez, an architecture student, leftist, and former “Miss Guatemala,” suffered a 
similarly hideous fate in 1968.   Her butchers publicly displayed Cruz’s mutilated and raped, naked 
corpse (Grandin 2004: 103).  Ronni Moffit drowned in her own blood after her carotid artery and 
windpipe were severed by shrapnel.  Moffit, a U.S. citizen, was accompanying Orlando Letelier, 
the former foreign minister of Chile, in a car in Washington D.C. in September 1976.  Agents of 
the Chilean security force, DINA, operating under the aegis of the international terrorist network 
dubbed “Operation Condor,” detonated a remote-control bomb that killed Letelier and Moffit and 
wounded Moffit’s husband (Dinges and Landau 1980).  Rufina Amaya Márquez witnessed the 
decapitation of her husband and heard her children scream for help in the village of El Mozote 
in El Salvador.  Her husband and four children, which included María Isabel, 8 months, were 
among the 800 massacred by the El Atacatl Battalion in December 1981.  Soldiers also tossed 
babies in the air and caught them on their bayonets(Danner 1994).  José Liborio Poblete and his 
wife, Gertrudis Hlaczik, were tortured and then disappeared under the direction of the notorious 
Argentine sergeant Julian Héctor Simón, known as “el turco Julian.”  The couple was disabled, 
with José having lost his legs in an automobile accident.  The torturers taunted José calling him 
“cortito” and turned him into a bowling ball, rolling him down flights of stairs.  Argentine security 
forces compounded the grief of the couple’s relatives by kidnapping the couple’s baby, Claudia, 
renaming her, and giving her to an Argentine military family.  Poblete’s crime of subversion had 
been that he had written a petition calling on Argentine companies to hire a fixed percentage of 
disabled workers (Rosenberg 1991: 112-17).
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Remarkably, political activists who were hunted down by right-wing security forces have gained 
political power in the twenty-first century.  In addition to former President Bachelet of Chile, 
there is President José Mujica of Uruguay.  Mujica was tortured during his 14 years as a political 
prisoner in Uruguayan jails.  The past two presidents of Argentina, Néstor Kirchner and Cristina 
Fernández de Kirchner, sought safety deep in Patagonia during la guerra sucia.   The brother of 
President Mauricio Funes of El Salvador was killed by police during a student protest in 1980. 
And Dilma Rousseff is president of Brazil, Latin America’s largest country.  In 1970, at the age 
of 22, Rousseff was incarcerated in a military prison, stripped naked, bound upside down, and 
administered electric shocks to her breasts, inner thighs, and head.  
This “radical evil,” to use Kant’s words, that darkened Latin America during the Cold War was 
perpetuated largely by military dictatorships and allied “death squads.”  Various international 
investigative bodies or “Truth Commissions” established that, depending on the country—
Guatemala, El Salvador, Chile, or Argentina, the forces of the extreme right bore responsibility 
for 85 to 99 percent of the violence.  During the period between 1950 and 1989, Latin America 
experienced 52 military golpes de estado (Smith 2012: 352-53).  Especially during the 1970s and 
1980s, Latin Americans throughout Central and South America endured under vicious military 
governments.  
During the Cold War the United States covertly aided military officers in their seizure of power 
and then publicly supported them with weapons and counterinsurgency training.  In the pursuit of 
Cold War, the United States destabilized governments in Argentina, Brazil, British Guiana, Bolivia, 
Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Uruguay.  It 
tried but failed to destabilize two other countries—Cuba and Haiti.  It also worked to strengthen 
repressive military-dominated regimes, like the Honduras of the 1980s, and police states, like the 
Uruguay of the 1970s (Rabe 2011).
The purpose of this article is not to recount the Cold War in Latin America, but to examine how 
Latin Americans and U.S. citizens choose to remember it.  Latin America and the United States 
have reacted in different ways to the end of the Cold War.  For Latin Americans, coming to 
terms with the meaning of the Cold War has been an ongoing process that has stretched into the 
twenty-first century.  Latin Americans have established commissions to establish the facts of what 
happened to their societies during the forty-five year confrontation between the United States and 
the Soviet Union.  For more than two decades, Latin Americans have been looking to locate their 
dead and find their missing children.  Latin Americans have also gradually concluded that they 
must prosecute the perpetrators of evil, if they are to achieve peace and closure in their societies. 
“Nunca Más” has become a rallying cry in the region.  The breaching of the Berlin Wall in 
November 1989 and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union in the summer of 1991 have not, 
however, prompted a similar pattern of reflection and soul-searching in the United States.  The joy 
and satisfaction over the new found freedom of Eastern Europeans, the unification of Germany, 
and the breakup of the Soviet Union has superseded any qualms about the hurt and pain inflicted 
upon Cold War bystanders.  U.S. officials have issued scattered apologies for Cold War decisions 
that destroyed the lives of Latin Americans.  But no agency of the U.S. government has conducted 
a systematic assessment of the U.S. role in Latin America during the Cold War.  The United States 
also continued to pursue an atavistic Cold War policy—hostility toward Fidel Castro and the 
Cuban Revolution.  However reluctantly, agencies like the CIA have gradually and incompletely 
complied with scholarly demands to release the documentary record on Cold War policies toward 
Latin America.   The release of records has not, however, prompted a public discussion about the 
past.  Discussion of the U.S. war in Latin America is largely confined to the scholarly community.
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2. LATIN AMERICAN COLD WAR MEMORIES
Argentina, the home of la guerra sucia, has led the way in historical inquiry.  The generals and 
admirals that had murdered 30,000 Argentines left office in disgrace after the military debacle 
that was the war to liberate the Malvinas.  Devastated by the embarrassing defeat and the military 
casualties, the Argentine public turned in fury against the junta.  General Leopoldo Galtieri 
(1981-82) resigned as president and was replaced by a caretaker general who promised elections. 
Argentina’s anti-Communist military leaders had demonstrated to the world that their leadership 
skills and competence were limited to torturing and murdering defenseless civilians.  In 1983, 
Argentines elected Raúl Alfonsín (1983-89) of the Radical Party as president.  
President Alfonsín named a Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas (CONADEP) to 
establish the truth about state terrorism in Argentina.  In 1984, CONADEP, which was chaired by 
the renowned novelist and scientist Ernesto Sábato, issued its report from hell, Nunca Más.  The 
report documented 340 secret detention centers and 8,960 “disappeared” persons.  The report 
further concluded that the number of disappeared was substantially higher than 8,960.  Nunca 
Más opened with an allusion to the destruction of European Jewry, noting that “many of the 
events described in this report will be hard to believe.  This is because the men and women 
of our nation have only heard of such horror in reports from distant places.”  CONADEP also 
indicted the military’s anti-Communist rationales, their national security doctrines, labeling them 
as “totalitarian” (CONADEP, 1984). Nunca Más served as an inspiration to other crusaders for 
human rights throughout Latin America.  Chile, El Salvador, and Guatemala would issue similar 
reports in the 1990s on atrocities during the Cold War.  In Brazil, the Archdiocese of São Paulo, 
under the brave leadership of Cardinal Paulo Evarista Arns, published in 1985 its report on state-
sponsored torture and murder in Brasil: Nunca Mais.  Nunca Mais was based on a purloined copy 
of the Supreme Military Tribunal’s archive, which contained documents and photos produced by 
military courts against political prisoners (Evaristo Arns 1986).  As Argentines began the search 
for the desaparecidos in mass graves, they developed forensic skills in exhuming and identifying 
bodies.  Argentine anthropologists thereafter assisted other nations in Latin America in recovering 
and identifying remains.  Argentines scientists worked, for example, in establishing that a massacre 
occurred in El Mozote in El Salvador (Cardenas 2010: 165-66).  
President Alfonsín authorized the prosecution of junta members (six generals and three admirals) 
who tyrannized Argentina from 1976 to 1982.  The military leaders were unrepentant, with Admiral 
Emilio Massera claiming he had fought a “just war” against terrorism.  The chief prosecutor labeled 
the military leaders as “criminals” who ordered the murder and torture of innocent civilians.  A 
panel of judges in a federal appellate court found five of the junta members guilty and sentenced 
them to prison.  General Jorge Videla and Admiral Massera received life sentences.  Three of 
the four acquitted subsequently received prison sentences from military courts.  Argentines, 
including the mothers and grandmothers of Plaza de Mayo, thereafter called for the prosecution 
of the military subordinates who had kidnapped, murdered, and tortured.  Facing an increasingly 
mutinous and disloyal military, President Alfonsín decided to accept punto final (end point) and 
“due obedience” laws that would sharply curtail prosecutions.  The due obedience law exempted 
military personnel below the rank of colonel from prosecution.  The Argentine president reasoned 
that he had to prevent another military golpe and safeguard Argentine constitutionalism.  Arguing 
that Argentina needed to move forward and focus on economic development, President Carlos 
Saúl Menem (1989-99), Alfonsín’s successor, pardoned the convicted officers and those who had 
been indicted.  Impunity had seemingly triumphed over justice in Argentina (Wright 2007: 141-78). 
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Domestic and international developments combined to lead Argentines from the late 1990s on to 
once again reassess their Cold War past.  Argentines were left aghast, when, on 9 March 1995, 
Captain Adolfo Scilingo, confessed on a popular television news show that he had participated 
in two of the weekly “death flights,” dumping thirty living but drugged desaparecidos into the 
South Atlantic.  The articulate Scilingo, who was now conscience-stricken, appeared handsome, 
educated, socially adept, and, wearing a suit by Christian Dior, well groomed.  Less visually 
appealing on television, but equally horrifying, was the torturer Julio Simón, “el turco Julian.” 
Simón, who attached a big swastika to his watch chain, was an opera fanatic and would listen 
to operatic music before commencing his torture sessions.  He favored pushing sticks up the 
victim’s anus while shocking them with 220 volts of electricity.  Speaking directly to the camera, 
the unrepentant Simón said “the norm was to kill everyone and anyone kidnapped was tortured.” 
He defended himself, asserting that he was fighting “terrorist hordes” and that “torture is eternal” 
and an “essential part of the human being.”  Such revelations, dubbed “the Scilingo effect,” helped 
push Argentines into action (Feitlowitz, 1998: 193-255).  A new organization, the children of the 
murdered and disappeared, joined with the Plaza de Mayo women to agitate for justice.  Jurists 
also challenged the constitutionality of pardons and legal immunities, citing such issues as the 
stolen children and the legal concept of habeas corpus. 
The Argentines received support in their quest for justice from the international legal community. 
Growing out of memories of the Holocaust, the principles of the Nuremburg trials, the adoption 
of the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights, and continued atrocities in places such as East Pakistan 
(Bangladesh), Cambodia, Guatemala, Uganda, Bosnia, and Rwanda, international lawyers and 
global leaders began to argue there was “universal jurisdiction” for crimes against humanity. 
Belgium adopted a law in 1993 giving its legal system jurisdiction over war crimes anywhere in 
the world.  Italian and Spanish jurists initiated extradition proceedings against Latin American 
military officers, charging that they had killed European nationals in countries such as Argentina, 
Chile, and Uruguay.  Spanish judge Baltazar Garzón electrified the international legal community 
when, in 1998, he demanded the arrest and extradition to Spain of General Augusto Pinochet 
of Chile on crimes of murder, torture, and genocide.In 2005, Judge Garzón imposed a lengthy 
sentence on Captain Scilingo, who was residing in Spain, for the thirty murders he helped commit 
in the 1970s (Borzutzky 2007).  
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, Argentine jurists have pursued the criminals 
who waged la guerra sucia.  In 2001, an Argentine federal judge ruled the punto final and due 
obedience laws unconstitutional, reasoning they violated both Argentine and international law. 
The disappearance of persons was judged a crime against humanity and could not be amnestied. 
The court’s judgment, which was upheld by Argentina’s Supreme Court in 2005, received political 
support from President Néstor Kirchner (2003-07) and his successor and wife, Cristina Fernández 
de Kirchner (2007-).  The government decreed that Escuela Superior de Mecánica de la Armada 
(ESMA) in Buenos Aires would be transformed into a space for memory and the defense of 
human rights.  Over 5,000 Argentines had been confined in the ESMA torture center.  Ninety 
percent of those never emerged alive from the military facility.
Both the prominent and unpublicized perpetrators of murder and torture in Argentina faced 
justice.  In 2002, General Galtieri was again indicted and put under house arrest; he died a few 
months later of a heart attack.  In 2006, “el turco Julian” ( Julio Simón) received a twenty-five-
year sentence for the torture of a disabled couple and the theft of their child.  In 2008, Luciano 
Benjamín Menédez, the military commander who oversaw the notorious La Perla detention 
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center in the city of Córdoba, received a life sentence for the kidnapping, torture, and murder of 
four political activists.  In April 2010, an Argentine court convicted Reynaldo Bignone, a retired 
general and Argentina’s last dictator (1982-83), for the kidnapping, torture and murder of fifty-
six people.  Bignone, 82, received a twenty-five-year sentence.  In late 2011, Bignone received an 
additional fifteen-year sentence for setting up in 1976 a secret torture center inside a hospital, 
where doctors and nurses were abused.  In 2013, the military dictator, General Jorge Rafael Videla 
(1976-81), died in the Marcos Paz Prison in Buenos Aires.  In 2010, General Videla received a life 
sentence for the murder of thirty-one political prisoners.  Human rights activists also celebrated 
the life sentence handed down in 2007 to the Reverend Christian von Wernich, a Roman Catholic 
priest.  Father von Wernich was present at torture sessions, helping extract confessions, while at 
the same time offering consoling words to family members seeking their loved ones who had 
been kidnapped.  The conviction forced both lay and religious people to confront the Church’s 
complicity in Argentina’s sordid past.
International jurists also contributed to the movement for justice.  In 1990, a jury in France 
convicted in absentia Navy Captain Alfredo Astiz for the disappearance of two French nuns.  The 
nuns had been working with Argentine groups, including the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, in 
trying to learn about the fate of the disappeared.  Captain Astiz, who was known as the “Angel 
of Death,” for his youthful appearance, blonde hair, and ruthlessness, had infiltrated the peace 
groups, claiming that he had a brother who had also disappeared.  In late 2009, Argentine jurists 
began to process of putting Captain Astiz on trial for murder and subsequently convicted and 
sentenced Astiz to life imprisonment for crimes against humanity on 26 October 2011. In 2008, 
Spanish authorities arrested a Dutch-Argentine airline pilot, Julio Alberto Poch, who flew planes 
used to throw Argentines into the sea.  In 2010, the Spanish High Court ordered the pilot’s 
extradition to Argentina to face charges.  He is now in an Argentine prisonawaiting trial, charged 
with forty-one murders.
Chile’s movement from impunity to justice followed a path similar to Argentina’s.  The callous 
General Pinochet dominated political life in Chile until 1998, long after the Cold War had ended. 
Under mounting domestic and international pressure, Pinochet had agreed to hold a plebiscite in 
1988, giving Chileans a choice on whether they wanted a continuation of one-man rule.  Chile’s 
left and center political parties united in a political alliance known as the Concertación and urged 
Chileans to vote “no.”  The “no” vote triumphed by a decisive 55 to 43 percent.  Pinochet relinquished 
the presidency, but he maintained substantial control.  In 1978, he had declared a general amnesty 
for uniformed personnel.  His constitution granted him the power to stay as commander-in-chief 
of the armed forces until 1998.  The constitution also provided for non-elected senators, who were 
Pinochet’s acolytes, to take seats in in the Chilean legislature.  In 1990, the glowering Pinochet 
draped the presidential sash over Patricio Aylwin of the Christian Democrats.  After twenty-seven 
years of military rule, Chile had returned to free elections and constitutional processes.
President Aylwin (1990-94) and his successor Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994-2000), the son of 
the former president, moved cautiously on human rights issues.  Aylwin appointed a National 
Commission on Truth and Reconciliation headed by a veteran politician from the Radical Party, 
Raúl Rettig.  The Rettig Commission lacked subpoena power.  It was authorized only to investigate 
deaths at the hands of state agents.  It could not name perpetrators of crimes, and it could not 
investigate cases of arbitrary detention or of people who had been tortured but not murdered. 
Despite the restraints, the Rettig Commission provided a notable service to Chileans with its 
1991 report.  It documented over 2,000 deaths and disappearances.  Subsequent investigations 
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raised the death toll to over 3,000.  The commission rejected the Pinochet fantasy that the country 
had been at war after the overthrow of Salvador Allende and demonstrated that most of the 
dead were unarmed civilians, not armed guerrillas.  Even as the commission took testimony, 
its work was aided by the discovery in June 1990 of a mass grave in Pisagua, a port city in 
northern Chile.  Chileans gasped as they looked at the mummified faces of the disappeared on 
television and in newspaper photographs.  General Pinochet denounced the Rettig Commission 
as a “sewer” and boasted that the armed forces took pride in saving the country from terrorism 
and international communism.  The government thereafter provided compensation to the families 
of the executed and disappeared but did not challenge the 1978 amnesty law.The only prominent 
Chilean officer prosecuted was Manuel Contreras of DINA who had overseen Operation Condor 
and the assassination of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffit in Washington in 1976.  Contreras 
received, however, only a light sentence for his crime (Wright 2007: 179-224).  
After 1998, Chileans began to engage directly with the past.  General Pinochet stepped down as 
military commander, twenty-five years after he seized power, and took his seat in the legislature as 
“a senator for life.”  The audacious action infuriated the families of the victims and the hundreds 
of thousands of Chileans who had been arbitrarily detained or tortured.  As a senator, Pinochet 
would also preserve his impunity.  In September 1998, the cocky general travelled to London for a 
back operation.  Spain’s Judge Garzón seized the moment.  Armed with the extradition treaty that 
existed between Spain and the United Kingdom, Garzón issued a warrant for Pinochet’s arrest. 
On 16 October 1998, British authorities arrested Pinochet, and he was kept under house arrest 
for the next sixteen months as the Spanish, British, and Chileans wrangled over the legal and 
jurisdictional issues.  The British Foreign Office eventually shipped Pinochet home, ruling that he 
lacked the mental capacities to stand trial.  Pinochet feigned illness, including dementia.  But the 
once terrorized Chileans realized that their emperor no longer wore clothes.  General Augusto 
Pinochet had become an epic international embarrassment (Roht-Arriaza 2005: 32-96).
After 2000, Pinochet would constantly find himself barraged with criminal cases and would 
lose his legal immunity and his senatorial seat.  Chileans’ fury mounted when they learned that 
Pinochet and his henchmen had stashed cash in banks around the world.  Pinochet’s secret bank 
accounts amounted to $28 million.  Claiming their client’s ill health, lawyers kept Pinochet out 
of a Chilean jail.  The dictator died in late 2006 at the age of ninety-one.  Pinochet’s military 
colleagues were not as fortunate.  A Chilean judge, Juan Guzmán, successfully argued that the 
amnesty law did not exempt from prosecution those who had “disappeared” Chileans, because, 
under a writ of habeas corpus, the lack of a body meant that the kidnapping was an ongoing crime. 
Latin America’s military dictatorships and death squads had thought they were clever when they 
“disappeared” victims or disfigured bodies beyond recognition.  They were confident that they 
would never be prosecuted, because evidence no longer existed.  By the end of 2006, over 100 
Chileans, including numerous generals, had been convicted of disappearing Chileans.  Manuel 
Contreras of Operation Condor received a life sentence in 2008 for the assassination of Chilean 
General Carlos Prats and his wife in a car bomb attack in Buenos Aires in 1974.  In late 2012, 
a Chilean judge charged eight retired military officers for the murder of the popular folk singer, 
Víctor Jara.  A day after the overthrow of President Allende, Jara was arrested and transported to 
Chile Stadium where he was tortured and shot forty-four times with machine-gun bullets.
Beyond prosecuting its criminals, Chile took a variety of other measures to come to terms with 
its ghastly past.  President Ricardo Lagos Escobar (2000-06), Chile’s first socialist president since 
Allende, appointed a new commission, known as the Valech Commission, to listen to those who 
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had been tortured.  Over 36,000 Chileans came forward to provide evidence of torture.  The 
commission also identified over 1,000 detention and torture centers.  The most notorious torture 
center, Villa Grimaldi, was transformed into a memorial for Pinochet’s victims.  Both President 
Bachelet and her mother had been tortured at Villa Grimaldi.  Chileans also renamed another 
notorious place of  torture, Chile Stadium, “EstadioVíctorJara,” after the murdered folk singer.  And 
Chile erected a statue of Salvador Allende in the Plaza de la Constitución, near the presidential 
plaza, La Moneda (Stern 2010).  Finally, Chileans exhumed the bodies of notables, such as poet 
Pablo Neruda, the Nobel Laureate, to determine whether they died of natural causes or were 
poisoned by followers of General Pinochet (Stavans 2013).   
The truth commissions in Argentina, Chile, and El Salvador documented atrocities and assigned 
responsibility for the carnage to the anti-Communist agents of the state.  Analysts have noted, 
however, that these commissions avoided an extensive discussion of the political and social context 
in which the violence took place.  Fears of another military golpe imposed caution on the fact finders. 
In Guatemala, the multivolume study, Memoria del silencio, compiled by the Comisión para la 
Esclarecimiento Historíco (CEH), broke from that circumspect approach.  International pressure 
brought an end to the country’s civil war in 1996.  The United Nations designed the structure 
and composition of the Guatemalan commission.  Beyond attributing to state security forces over 
90 percent of Guatemala’s 200,000 deaths, Memoria del silencio explicitly repudiated “the theory 
of the two demons.”  The dead were not “collateral damage,” having been caught in the crossfire 
between two warring armies.  Agents of the state had targeted people because they were union 
leaders, rural organizers, and student activists who protested repression in Guatemala and wanted 
freedom and social justice. The military regimes also perpetrated racist, genocidal policies against 
the Mayan.  The United States bore responsibility for the violence that swept over Guatemala 
for four decades.  As the report noted, after the overthrow of President Jacobo Arbenz in 1954, 
“there was a rapid reduction in the opportunity for political expression.”  A “fundamentalist anti-
communism” thereafter inspired legislation that “consolidated the restrictive and exclusionary 
nature of the political system.”  The Cold War policies of the United States received an enthusiastic 
welcome from elites and right-wing political groups in Guatemala.  The United States backed 
military regimes and directed its military assistance “towards reinforcing the national intelligence 
apparatus and for training the officer corps in counterinsurgency techniques, key factors which 
had significant bearing on human rights violations during the armed confrontation.”  Indeed, the 
United States fostered “criminal counterinsurgency” with its anti-Soviet strategy in Latin America 
(CEH 1998).
Releasing historical analyses that interpret violence within a political and social context does not 
guarantee the pursuit of justice.  President Alvaro Arzú, sitting next to his military commanders, 
showed no emotion as the head commissioner, Dr. Christian Tomushat of Germany, presented 
the report to a packed audience in Guatemala’s National Theatre on 25 February 1999.  President 
Arzú declined to step to the podium to accept Memoria del silencio.  A year before, the archdiocese 
of Guatemala City, led by Bishop Juan José Gerardi, released its four-volume study, Recuperación 
de la memoria históica, which recounted the military’s atrocities against the Guatemalan people 
(ODHAG, 1999).  A few days after the release of the report, assailants bludgeoned to death 
Bishop Gerardi.  The bishop’s face was so disfigured that his corpse could be identified only by 
his episcopal ring.  
Guatemala has not initiated a comprehensive campaign to identify and prosecute its murderers 
and terrorists, although it did convict three mid-level military officers for the murder of Bishop 
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Gerardi and, in 2012, a Guatemalan court issued a life sentence (6,060 years) to a soldier for his 
role in the massacre of 201 Mayan peasants in the village of Dos Erres in 1982.  The convicted 
soldier’s commander-in-chief, President Efraín Ríos Mont (1982-83), is still not in jail for overseeing 
the destruction of Mayan communities.  But the former president and military general no longer 
breathes with impunity.  In 1999, Rigoberta Menchú, the Guatemalan human rights activist and 
indigenous leader who received the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1992, filed charges of genocide against 
Ríos Montt in a Spanish court.  A Spanish judge subsequently issued an international warrant for 
the arrest of Ríos Montt.  Guatemala refused, however, to extradite the former president, who had 
been a member of the Guatemalan Senate (Garrard-Burnett 2010).  Facing both international and 
domestic pressure, Guatemala finally put the old dictator, 86, on trial in 2013.  The testimony was 
horrifying, with one man recounting how the military killed his wife and two children, slashing his 
5-year-old son’s face with a machete and smashing his toddlers head (Malkin 2013).  A Guatemalan 
tribunal, on 10 May 2013, found Ríos Montt guilty of genocide against the Mayan people and 
sentenced him to eighty years in prison.  But within two weeks, Guatemala’s Constitutional Court 
overturned the conviction on a technicality.  The nation’s conservative oligarchy and business elite 
had vehemently opposed the trial.  Ríos Montt may be retried in the future.  
Other Latin American countries have not fully confronted their Cold War past.  Uruguay’s 
truth commission documented 164 disappearances between 1973 and 1984 during the military 
dictatorship.  But responding to political and military pressure, the commission declined to say 
that the practice of disappearing people was official policy.  In the 1980s, Uruguayans approved, 
both legislatively and via a plebiscite, amnesties for the military and leftist guerrillas. The amnesty 
applied only to crimes committed in Uruguay.  Uruguayan authorities have prosecuted officers 
who participated in Operation Condor, such as General Gregorio Alvarez (1981-85), Uruguay’s 
last dictator, who received a twenty-five-year sentence on 22 October 2009 for involvement in 
thirty-seven homicides and human rights violations.  On 19 October 2009, Uruguay’s Supreme 
Court declared the amnesty law for the military unconstitutional in reference to a specific case. 
In July 2011, dictator Juan María Bordaberry (1972-76) died under house arrest, having previously 
received a thirty-year sentence for human rights crimes from an Uruguayan court.  In May 2013, 
General Miguel Dalmao received a twenty-eight year sentence for the murder of a leftist university 
professor in1974.  
South America’s most influential nation, Brazil, has not officially assessed the era of military 
dictatorship (1964-85).  The study, Nunca Mais, produced by the archdiocese of Săo Paulo remained 
the most comprehensive assessment of murder and torture in Brazil.  The military amnesty law 
of 1979 has not been repealed or declared unconstitutional by Brazilian courts, although in 2010 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Cost Rica judged the amnesty invalid.  Brazilian 
authorities did not investigate deaths, disappearances, or torture during the military dictatorship. 
Brazil has shown remarkable economic growth in the twenty-first century, and Brazil became 
a leading voice in global economic affairs, especially under the leadership of the working-class 
hero, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2011), known popularly as “Lula.”  President Lula 
disappointed Brazil’s human rights community by not establishing a truth commission to establish 
responsibility for military-era crimes.  The able Brazilian leader was aware of the past.  His 
minister of culture was Gilberto Gil, the internationally renowned recording artist who was forced 
into exile by the Brazilian military.  The president’s chief of staff was Dilma Rousseff.  As a young 
woman, Rousseff resisted Brazilian military rule, was captured, and spent three years in prison on 
charges of participating in an armed militant group.  In 2012, President Rosseff (2011-) established 
a truth commission to investigate human rights abuses perpetrated by the military dictators.  The 
commission is scheduled to report its findings in 2014 (Romero, 2012).
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3. APOLOGIES
Noteworthy apologies emanated from Latin America’s historical thinking.  In February 2009, the 
president of Guatemala, Álvaro Colom (2008-12), apologized to Cuba on behalf of his country for 
having allowed the CIA to train Cuban exiles in Guatemala for the invasion of the Bay of Pigs. 
On his official visit to Havana, Colom also awarded Guatemala’s highest honor to Fidel Castro. 
In 2011, President Colom apologized to the son of President Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán (1952-54) for 
the “great crime” that was the CIA-sponsored overthrow of the constitutional presidency (Malkin 
2011).  In tribute to the deposed leader, Colom renamed a main highway after President Arbenz. 
In 2012, President Mauricio Funes of El Salvador acknowledged the government’s responsibility for 
the massacre of 936 civilians in the village of El Mozote in 1981.  He called the counterinsurgency 
operation by the nation’s military “the biggest massacre of civilians in the contemporary history 
of Latin America.”  President Funes also asked for forgiveness from the relatives of the estimated 
12,000 people who disappeared during the 1980s civil conflict, which left 75,000 dead (Associated 
Press 2012). 
In Cuba, which had become an internationally insignificant country in the post-Cold War era, 
nostalgia reigned.  In 1997, on the thirtieth anniversary of his death, the body of Ernesto Che 
Guevara was “discovered” buried under the runway at the airfield in Valle Grande, Bolivia. 
Bolivian authorities delivered Che’s remains to Cubans who transported the remains back to 
Cuba.  After a grand ceremony extolling Che’s virtues, the Cubans returned the body to earth 
in Santa Clara.  Troops commanded by Che had liberated the Cuban city in late 1958.  Che had 
passed on to becoming an international symbol of romantic revolution.  He was further associated 
with the optimistic times of the 1950s and 1960s.  Forgotten was the pathetic, foolish mission that 
led to Che’s death in Bolivia.  Yearnings for the symbolic Che were highlighted by the release of 
two feature films about Guevara, The Motorcycle Diaries (2004) with the Mexican heartthrob, Gael 
García Bernal, and the four-hour epic, Che (2008), starring Benicio Del Toro.  Websites marketed 
Che memorabilia.  T-shirts adorned with Che’s visage were especially popular.
Latin Americans were not the only people issuing apologies for the Cold War in the Western 
Hemisphere.  In 1999, during a visit to Guatemala, after the release of Memoria del silencio, President 
Bill Clinton observed that it was “imperative” that he address the report.  In frank language, Clinton 
said: “For the United States, it is important that I state clearly that support for military forces or 
intelligence units which engage in violent and widespread repression of the kind described in the 
report was wrong, and the United States must not repeat that mistake.”  Secretary of State Colin 
Powell also suggested that there were Cold War activities that did not bring credit to the United 
States.  In 2003, Secretary Powell addressed the U.S. role in the overthrow of Salvador Allende, 
noting “it is not a part of American history that we are proud of.”  The Chilean government of 
President Ricardo Lagos responded that it was pleased that the United States “now considers it was 
an error” to have supported the military golpe that overthrew President Allende (Rabe 2011: 187).
4. U.S. COLD WAR MEMORIES
Sporadic expressions of regret about the U.S. role in Latin America in the Cold War did not 
inspire demands for investigations and accountability.  In the realm of public discourse, joy and 
satisfaction over the demise of the Soviet Union and the liberation of Eastern Europe crowded 
out thoughts about the dear prices that Latin Americans paid during the Cold War.  Happy 
reenactments of the breaching of the Berlin Wall, as took place on 9 November 2009, the twentieth 
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anniversary, sent the message that the West had acted nobly and bravely in confronting the Soviet 
Union and communism.  Photographs of Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany, Lech Walsea of 
Poland, and Mikhail Gorbachev of the former Soviet Union together in the new Berlin in a united 
Germany delivered the message that the Cold War was a “good war.”  
Only the continuing presence of Henry Kissinger, Richard Nixon’s sidekick, caused some to think 
about U.S. actions in Latin America.  Kissinger enjoyed a position as a sage and thoughtful 
commentator on international affairs, who was consulted by influential journalists and asked to 
appear on high-toned public affairs television programs. But the iconoclastic public intellectual, 
Christopher Hitchens, called for Kissinger to face war crimes trials for his decisions and policies, 
including his involvement in the assassination of General René Schneider of Chile (Hitchens 
2001).  Kissinger has also faced calls from international jurists in Argentina and Chile to testify 
about his involvement with Operation Condor and the overthrow of Salvador Allende.  Kissinger, 
through his lawyers, issued the vague response that he wished to “contribute what he can from 
his memory of those distant events.”  In his memoirs, Kissinger went to great lengths to absolve 
himself of responsibility for horrors in South America.  Kissinger has also faced a little trouble 
abroad.  In 2001 a French judge sent police officers to Kissinger’s hotel in Paris to serve him with 
a request to answer questions about U.S. involvement in the Chilean golpe.  French citizens had 
disappeared during the Pinochet era.  Kissinger refused to respond to the subpoena, referred the 
matter to the Department of State, and flew on to Italy (Rohter 2002).
One U.S. casualty of the Cold War in Latin America was the infamous School of Americas.  By 
2000, the school had trained over 60,000 members of the Latin American military.  An analysis of 
the Truth Commission for El Salvador report demonstrated that 75 percent of the military officers 
cited for involvement in major massacres in El Salvador had trained at the School of Americas. 
Other criminals who had studied at the school included Leopoldo Galtieri of Argentina and 
Efrain Ríos Montt of Guatemala.  Roman Catholic peace activists, who opposed U.S. policies 
in Central America in the 1980s, had consistently called for the closing of the facility.  In the 
1990s, Representative Joseph Kennedy, the son of the former attorney general and the nephew 
of President Kennedy, took up their cause.  Representative Kennedy, who represented the state 
of Massachusetts, pressured the U.S. military to declassify training manuals used at the school. 
The manuals referred to tactics of false imprisonment, abuse of prisoners, torture, and the 
“neutralization” or assassination of suspects.  The Department of Defense discontinued the use of 
the manuals in 1996.  Kennedy and his successors annually attempted to cut off funds for the school, 
finally succeeding in 1999.  The Clinton administration closed the School of the Americas in 2000 
but reopened it in January 2001 as the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation. 
The new school, located at Ft. Benning in Georgia, claimed that it emphasized democracy and 
human rights to its military enrollees from Latin America (Gill 2004).
The United States has given haphazard assistance to the hunt for murderers and torturers who 
fled their country.  In 2007, the human rights community hailed the arrest in the Washington D.C. 
area and subsequent extradition to Argentina of Ernesto Guillermo Barreiro.  Major Barreiro 
was the chief interrogator at the La Perla detention center in Córdoba.  The new Barack Obama 
administration (2009-) has been somewhat forthcoming on human rights issues, extraditing alleged 
criminals to El Salvador and Guatemala. The U.S. legal system failed, however, to convict Luis 
Posada Carriles, a Cuban exile and former CIA asset who is wanted in Cuba and Venezuela on 
charges of masterminding the destruction a Cuban airliner in flight in 1976, killing 73 people. 
Twenty-four members of Cuba’s national fencing team, as well as a Guyanese child, died in the 
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explosion.  Posada, who trained in explosives and sabotage at the School of the Americas in the 
1960s, publicly denied involvement in the destruction of Cubana Airlines Flight 455 or that he 
organized terrorist attacks on tourist facilities in Cuba in 1997 that killed and injured European 
tourists.  Posada has lived freely in Miami since 2007, where he has support among anti-Castro 
exiles.  In 2007, a federal judge in El Paso, Texas dismissed immigration charges against Posada 
for illegally entering the United States in 2005.  In April 2009, the Justice Department filed eleven 
new charges against Posada in federal court in El Paso, alleging he lied about the 1997 bombings 
and committed immigration fraud.  In 2011, a jury in El Paso found the elderly Posada, 83, not 
guilty of all charges, even though jurors heard tape recordings of Posada discussing his role in the 
1997 bombings (Frosch, 2011).
Luis Posada’s ability to preserve his impunity pointed to the continuing Cold War between the 
United States and Cuba.  The U.S. policy of hostility toward Castro’s Cuba had barely changed 
between 1989 and 2013, even though Fidel Castro no longer dominated Cuba.  In mid-2006, 
Castro had become seriously ill and transferred leadership to his brother, Raúl, in 2008.  Public 
opinion polls demonstrated that U.S. citizens believed the non-recognition policy and the trade 
embargo were anachronistic, and U.S. exporters, especially farmers, were eager to sell their goods 
in Cuba.  Their views were seconded by human rights activists in Cuba who wanted democracy 
for the island.  
U.S. political leaders constantly worried, however, about the reaction of Cuban-Americans to a 
détente with Cuba.  Political conservatives also had fond memories of the Cold War and did not 
mind seeing it continue.  In 1996, the U.S. Congress tightened the trade embargo against Cuba 
with the Helms-Burton Act.  In 1999-2000, U.S. citizens engaged in a hysterical debate over 
whether little Elián González should be returned to his father and communism in Cuba.  The 
child had been found clinging to an inner tube off the coast of Ft. Lauderdale, Florida.  Elián’s 
mother had tried to escape Cuba, but she and ten others drowned when their boat capsized.  The 
Clinton administration followed international and domestic law and returned the boy to his father 
(Schoultz 2009: 419-567).  
Whereas the Cold War persisted with Cuba, the United States abandoned its Cold War concerns 
about Central America.  El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, the last theatres of the Cold War, 
were devastated countries.  As measured on the 2012 U.N. Development Index of 187 countries, El 
Salvador ranked 107th, Nicaragua ranked 129th,  Guatemala ranked 133rd.  The three counties had 
low per capita incomes and miserable records on the provision of health and education to their 
people (United Nations 2012).  Once the Cold War was over, the United States stopped focusing 
on the region.  U.S. economic aid to Central America fell from $1.2 billion in 1985 to $167 million 
in 1996.  The three countries depend on money sent home, remesas, from Central Americans who 
had migrated to the United States.  An estimated 25 percent of El Salvador’s population lived in 
the United States in 2013, and remesas accounted for 18 percent of the country’s gross domestic 
product. The U.S. prescription for Central America’s economic health became trade, not aid.  The 
United States has opened the U.S. market through the Central American Free Trade Agreement 
(CAFTA) (2005).  The Dominican Republic, another impoverished country in which the United 
States waged Cold War, joined CAFTA.  
The sharp reduction in economic aid to Central America further indicated that there would not 
be much official thinking or regretting about the Cold War in Latin America.  In the public realm, 
debates over the issue of access to the documentary record have been the U.S. equivalent of a 
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truth commission.  Scholars have made progress on the opening the official record.  In 2003, the 
Historical Office of the State Department released a volume in its Foreign Relations of the United 
States series on the U.S. intervention in Guatemala.  In 1983, the Historical Office published a 
volume on Latin America, 1952-1954, which included a section on U.S. policy toward Guatemala. 
Those documents did not demonstrate, however, that the United States had intervened in 
Guatemala (Rabe 2004).  The National Security Archive based at George Washington University 
became a relentless advocate for declassifying documents on the Cold War in Latin America. 
The Clinton administration proved especially amenable to opening the record, authorizing major 
declassifications of records on U.S. policies toward El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.  In 
1999, the administration, in response to the mounting international furor over General Pinochet, 
produced the Chile Declassification Project.  The project yielded over 20,000 documents on U.S. 
policies toward Chile from 1973 to 1990 (Kornbluh 2003).  In 2009, the State Department released 
in electronic form a volume on U.S. relations with Latin America during the first administration 
of Richard Nixon (U.S. Department of State 2009).  The electronic volume generated international 
publicity, because it demonstrated that President Nixon had asked Brazil’s military government to 
enlist in the war against Salvador Allende.  Isabel Allende, daughter of Salvador Allende, called 
on Brazil to open archives that might shed light on any role it played in the overthrow of her father 
(Associated Press 2009).  U.S. and Latin American citizens have not, however, gained complete 
access to the documentary record.  The new electronic volume on Latin America did not offer 
documents on the Nixon administration’s attitude toward military governments in Bolivia and 
Uruguay.  In addition, in May 2011, Republicans in the House of Representatives blocked a move 
by Democrats to release U.S. intelligence files on the Argentine military dictatorship from 1976 to 
1983.  Argentine human rights activists argued that the secret documents might help them identify 
young people stolen as babies by the military junta.
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